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David Kopel’s article “The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases:
What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment”1 adds to the
growing literature by scholars seeking to establish a new paradigm for the
Second Amendment. Under existing doctrine, which has been in place since at
least 1939 (when the Supreme Court issued its only major Second Amendment
decision, United States v. Miller2), the Second Amendment has posed virtually
no impediment to either state or federal gun control laws. Suits challenging
state laws have failed for the simple reason that the Second Amendment does
not apply to the states; unlike most other Bill of Rights guarantees, the Court
has never “incorporated” the right to keep and bear arms into Fourteenth
Amendment restrictions on state conduct.
Suits challenging federal
enactments have failed because, under the dominant view: “Since the Second
Amendment ‘right to keep and bear Arms’ applies only to the right of the State
to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to bear arms, there can be
no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess
a firearm.”3
Beginning in the 1980s, however, and with accelerating speed in the past
decade, a group of revisionist scholars has advocated a broader, individualrights oriented approach to the Amendment.4 These revisionists have now
achieved some notable accomplishments. In the first place, the sheer volume
of revisionist scholarship has succeeded in placing the Second Amendment on
the scholarly agenda, and leading casebooks now acknowledge the revisionist
perspective.5
More important, in April of 1999 a federal District Court in Texas held that
a federal law prohibiting persons subject to restraining orders from possessing
firearms violated the Second Amendment.6 The court relied heavily on
revisionist scholarship. If the Texas decision stands – the case, United States

1. David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme
Court has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999).
2. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971).
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED (1984); JOYCE LEE
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment
and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates,
Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996);
Professor Kopel gives a full bibliography, KOPEL, supra note 1, at 101, footnote 9, although I do
not agree that every publication cited by Professor Kopel is properly placed in the revisionist
camp.
5. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 287 (1998 Supplement).
6. United States v. Emerson, 46 F.Supp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). I should note that I
authored an amicus curiae brief on behalf of law professors and historians arguing that the Fifth
Circuit should reverse the Emerson decision.
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v. Emerson,7 is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit – it will work a major
upheaval in Second Amendment doctrine. Even if not, it represents an
impressive achievement for a group of scholars self-consciously aiming to
move the law in a direction they favor.
Until now, the revisionists have based their argument entirely on claims
about the intentions of those who framed and ratified the Second Amendment.
Revisionists have heretofore conceded that the courts have rejected their
approach; indeed, the basic structure of the revisionist argument has been: The
Founders intended an individual right to firearm possession; the courts (abetted
by the academy) have all but nullified the Amendment by treating it as a mere
safeguard for militia; the courts should recognize their error and strike down
gun control laws.
With his latest contribution, Professor Kopel seeks to open a second front8
in the conflict over the Second Amendment by arguing that the Supreme Court
has in fact been quite sympathetic to the individual rights approach advocated
by the revisionists. To this end, he has collected all 35 of the Supreme Court
cases mentioning the Second Amendment or the “right to keep and bear
arms.”9
Reviewing these cases is certainly instructive, but I do not agree with
Professor Kopel about their meaning – at least not with the strong version of
his argument. Kopel’s main claim is that it is “well-settled” that the Second
Amendment confers “an individual right.”10 Supreme Court case law simply
cannot support that claim. Rather, the few well-known cases, chiefly Miller,
that deal with the Second Amendment at some length tell us that the Second
Amendment is not an “individual right” (as Professor Kopel is using that term),
and the rest of the cases canvassed by Professor Kopel tell us nothing at all
about the Second Amendment.
This finding itself is noteworthy, however, and it suggests a weaker
version of Kopel’s argument that can be supported: Contemporary Second
Amendment doctrine, which imposes very little restriction on efforts to
regulate private possession of firearms, has been elaborated mostly by lower
federal courts, not by the Supreme Court.11 This fact has some important

7. Id.
8. I take this point from my colleague Susan Herman.
9. Some readers may be wondering, “How did I miss all these Second Amendment cases?”
The answer is that only a handful of the cases discussed by Kopel deal with actual Second
Amendment claims made by litigants. The remainder refer to the Second Amendment in the
course of an argument on some other doctrine.
10. KOPEL, supra note 1, at 99. (See 1st paragraph)
11. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Eckert v. Pennsylvania,
331 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.3d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. Denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir.
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implications for the Second Amendment, and indeed for constitutional
interpretation generally.
I will suggest some of those implications below, but first I want to explain
my disagreement with Professor Kopel. I dispute his conclusion about the case
law for two reasons. First, his presentation of the question to be addressed –
does the Second Amendment confer an “individual” right or a “collective”
right? – is confused. Second, I challenge his treatment of the individual cases
mentioning the Second Amendment.
I.

THE “INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS” VS. “MILITIA-FOCUSED” DICHOTOMY

Kopel’s methodology is to identify two competing approaches to the
Second Amendment, and then to examine statements in Supreme Court
opinions to see which of the two approaches better makes sense of the
statements. Kopel identifies the two competing approaches as one which
“argues that the Amendment was meant to restrict the Congressional powers
over the militia”12 (I will call this the “militia-focused approach”) and one
contending that “the Amendment guarantees a right of individual Americans to
own and carry guns”13 (I will call this the “individual rights approach”).14
The first task is to define precisely what claims are being made by these
two approaches. Kopel characterizes the militia-focused approach in at least
two different ways:
“By the State’s Rights theory, the possession of a gun by any individual has no
constitutional protection; the Second Amendment applies only to persons
actively on duty in official state militias.”15
“If Henigan and Bogus are correct, then the [Supreme Court] should treat the
Second Amendment as a right which belongs to state governments, not to
American citizens.”16

1971); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d
384 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997); Fraternal Order of
Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
12. KOPEL, supra note 1, at 100.
13. Id. at 101. (STANDARD MODEL IN KOPEL)
14. Kopel calls these approaches the “Henigan/Bogus theory” (after two scholars) and the
“Standard Model” – so named because, according to Kopel, it expresses the “consensus of most
modern legal scholarship.” KOPEL, supra note 1, at 101. As I do not believe that most scholars
either do or should accept the individual rights approach, see, e.g., Carl Bogus, The Hidden
History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998) (citing sources); Id. at 317
n.34 (citing sources); Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 107 (1991); John Dwight Ingram & Allison Ann Ray, The Right(?) to Keep and Bear Arms,
27 N.M. L. REV. 491 (1997), and indeed courts have uniformly rejected it, see cases cited supra
note 12. I have adopted a more neutral shorthand.
15. KOPEL, supra note 1, at 106.
16. Id. at 109.
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Note the difference between these two descriptions of the militia-focused
approach: The first quotation focuses on the scope of the right at issue – does it
protect all instances of gun possession against government interference, or only
possession by an on-duty militiaman, or something in the middle. The second
quotation, by contrast, focuses on who can invoke the right in a judicial
proceeding.
In this latter understanding, the militia-focused approach holds that only
states have the ability to challenge federal statutes or regulations under the
Second Amendment – it turns the militia-focused approach into an argument
about standing, rather than about the merits of the claim. This would be a very
odd way to understand the Second Amendment. All constitutional rights –
even those most obviously concerned with government structure rather than
individual freedom – ultimately “belong” to individuals in the sense that
individual citizens can sue to vindicate them. In I.N.S. v. Chadha,17 the
Supreme Court vindicated Jagdish Chadha’s claim that congressional action
harming him violated the bicameral passage and presentment requirements of
Article I of the Constitution18 – does that mean that these basic separation of
powers provisions are “individual rights”? The enumeration of powers in
Article I, Section 8, and the 10th Amendment, which reinforces that
enumeration, are plainly “federalism” provisions in the sense that they are
intended to protect a certain allocation of authority between the federal
government and the states. Yet Alfonso Lopez, when he was convicted under
the federal Gun Free School Zones Act,19 was of course able to challenge that
statute as impermissible under the Commerce Clause.20 This does not mean
that the Commerce Clause or the 10th Amendment creates rights that are
“individual” in any sense other than that individuals may rely on them in legal
disputes – it certainly tells us nothing about the scope of the right available to
such individuals.
The position that only states have standing to challenge laws under the
Second Amendment, then, is a pure straw opponent.21 Unfortunately, it is

17. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
18. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
19. 18 U.S.C. §922(q).
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21. Well, maybe not a pure straw opponent. At least one federal court has employed the
militia-focused approach as a standing argument: Hickman v. Bock, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir.
1995), (“Because the Second Amendment guarantees the rights of the states to maintain armed
militia, the states alone stand in the position to show legal injury when this right is infringed.”)
Perhaps Hickman simply demonstrates that critics of standing doctrine are right to claim that its
injury requirement is circular, and that court decisions dismissing complaints for lack of standing
are equivalent to dismissals for failure to state a claim. But to those who do distinguish standing
requirements and the other elements a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to obtain relief, I
suggest that Hickman was incorrect, and that accepting a militia-focused approach to the Second
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precisely this understanding that Kopel most often attributes to the militiafocused school.
For example, the very first case Kopel discusses is Spencer v. Kemna,22 in
which Justice Stevens, in dissent, notes that “An official determination that a
person has committed a crime may . . . result in tangible harms such as
imprisonment [or] loss of the right to vote or to bear arms.”23 (Like most of
the cases Kopel discusses, Spencer v. Kemna has nothing to do with the
Second Amendment or with restrictions on firearms. The case decides whether
a habeas corpus petition is mooted by the prisoner’s release. Moreover, there
is no reason to think that Justice Stevens was referring to the constitutional
right to bear arms; he was probably noting that a criminal conviction may
trigger federal and state statutory prohibitions on owning guns – that the
convict will lose a statutory “right” to own guns. But no matter – let’s assume
for the sake of argument that Stevens is referring to the Second Amendment
right.)
Kopel comments on this quotation thus: “A person can only lose a right
upon conviction of a crime if a person had the right before conviction. Hence,
if an individual can lose his right ‘to bear arms,’ he must possess such a
right.”24 Kopel appears to believe that the excerpt from Spencer v. Kemna is
consistent only with the individual-rights approach and not with the militiafocused approach. But that is true only if the militia-focused approach means
that only States can insist on the vindication of Second Amendment rights.
The Spencer v. Kemna excerpt is perfectly consistent with a more sensible
version of the militia-focused approach which focuses on the scope of the
right.
Suppose, for example, a Militia-focused Scholar who believes that the
Second Amendment was intended solely to ensure the continuation of state
militia as the primary locus of military power in the United States, and who
therefore believes that the Amendment protects only the right of a member of a
state militia to possess a gun required for service in such militia. (Not that this
second claim follows necessarily from the first; those just happen to be the
beliefs of this particular Militia-focused Scholar.) The Spencer v. Kemna
quotation could easily come from the pen of this Militia-focused Scholar.
Even though this Militia-focused Scholar is concerned only to protect the
vitality of the militia, she of course understands that one fine way to further
this purpose is to empower individuals who are harmed by some federal law to
sue on the ground that the law violates the Second Amendment.

Amendment does not entail dismissing any suit brought by an individual citizen under the Second
Amendment for lack of standing.
22. Spencer v. Kemna, 421 U.S. 1(1998).
23. Id. at 36.
24. KOPEL, supra note 1, at 114.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1999]

THE SOUND OF SILENCE

195

II. SUPREME COURT CASES MENTIONING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Let me be clear: I am not denying that there is a choice to be made among
interpretations of the Second Amendment, including a strong individual-rights
approach, a strong militia-focused approach, and various positions in the
middle. I am simply trying to clarify the nature of that choice. What is really
at stake is the scope of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms: Does the
Second Amendment prohibit Congress from banning assault weapons? Does it
prohibit a ban on all handguns? Does it restrict States’ ability to regulate guns
at all? These are the urgent questions, and the competing approaches Kopel is
attempting to evaluate would indeed lead to different answers.25
Unfortunately, the cases discussed by Professor Kopel do not tell us much
about the Justices’ views on the merits of these competing approaches – unless
they are woefully overread.
A.

The Chaff

Start with Poe v. Ullman.26 Readers are no doubt familiar with this case
and will be surprised to see it on a list of “Second Amendment” cases. Poe of
course was the precursor to Griswold v. Connecticut;27 it was the Supreme
Court’s first brush with the constitutionality of laws forbidding contraception.
A majority of the Court in Poe rejected a challenge to such a law on
justiciability grounds. In dissent, Justice Harlan opined that the question was
justiciable, and on the merits he argued that the statute was unconstitutional.
Harlan articulates a broad right to privacy based in the Due Process Clause, an
analysis developed to fruition in Griswold and Roe v. Wade.28 His opinion
contains the following passage:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is not a series of isolated points
pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press and

25. It is worth noting here that the revisionists never quite specify just what a “personal”
Second Amendment would protect. The revisionists do not, for example, consider what level of
government interest (“reasonable” “compelling”?) would be required to justify infringing on an
individual’s Second Amendment interests (as they understand such interests). A court
considering an actual Second Amendment case would have to confront this issue (although the
Emerson court, which adopted the revisionists’ analysis, also omitted this crucial step; it leapt
without explanation from a judgment that the Second Amendment protects an “individual right”
to a holding that the statute at issue was unconstitutional, see Emerson, supra note 7. The tone of
the revisionists’ work suggests a belief that the Second Amendment, properly understood, would
invalidate much contemporary gun control legislation, but individual revisionist scholars may not
in fact be committed to this position.
26. 366 U.S. 497 (1961).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints. . . .29

This passage has been quite influential. I doubt, though, that it has ever before
been understood as saying anything meaningful about the Second Amendment.
Remarkably, Kopel reads this passage as implicitly endorsing an individualrights as opposed to a militia-focused view of the Second Amendment.
Indeed, he states: “It is impossible to read Justice Harlan’s words as anything
other than a recognition that the Second Amendment protects the right of
individual Americans to possess firearms.”30
But the Harlan quotation says nothing of the sort. Kopel’s only rationale
for his interpretation is that Harlan lists the right to keep and bear arms along
with other rights, such as free speech, that are obviously held by “individuals.”
Thus Kopel says: “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
obviously, protects a right of individuals against governments; it does not
protect governments, nor is it some kind of ‘collective’ right.”31 True enough,
but that is only meaningful if the Second Amendment debate centers on who
can claim the right rather than the scope of the right. Again, Kopel is misled
by his caricature of the militia-focused position.
Moreover, Kopel entirely misses the context of Harlan’s reference to the
right to keep and bear arms. Harlan’s whole point is that the Due Process right
is more than simply the sum of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Whatever the content of the right to keep and bear arms, Harlan is saying, we
must go beyond that right in enforcing the Due Process Clause. The very
structure of Harlan’s argument disclaims any intention to inquire into the
specific contours of the Second Amendment right – and makes any inference
about Harlan’s view as to the content of that right unsustainable. Yet Poe,
along with four other cases in which the only reference to the Second
Amendment is a quotation of the above passage from Poe,32 accounts for a
large chunk of the evidence relied on by Kopel.
In fact, Spencer and Poe are quite typical of almost all the cases canvassed
by Professor Kopel. Most of these cases mention the Second Amendment in
passing, usually along with other Bill of Rights provisions. Some refer to the
“liberty” protected by the Amendment, providing an excuse for speculation
about what that liberty must entail. But on close analysis, these cases are no
more enlightening than Spencer or Poe.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Poe, supra note 27, at 542-43.
KOPEL, supra note 1, at 149.
Id.
Poe, supra note 27.
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The Incorporation Cases

OK, so Spencer and Poe don’t really say anything about the Second
Amendment. Maybe Kopel overreaches on these cases – but can his argument
be saved by cases that address the Second Amendment more directly?
Nope. Apart from Miller (which I will discuss shortly), the only Supreme
court cases that actually decide a genuine issue of Second Amendment doctrine
are a line of cases, beginning with United States v. Cruikshank33 in 1875,
holding that the Amendment, unlike most other Bill of Rights provisions, does
not apply to the states. These cases are something of an embarrassment for the
revisionists; if the right to bear arms is truly a “personal” right like the right to
free speech or the right to be free of unreasonable searches, then one would
expect the Supreme Court to have “incorporated” the Second Amendment’s
protections into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. By
contrast, the Court’s failure to incorporate the Second Amendment is perfectly
consistent with the view that the purpose of the Amendment is to enable states
to maintain militia; states are certainly free to decline to take advantage of this
opportunity.
Kopel’s response to the challenge posed by these incorporation cases is to
suggest that the incorporation issue remains open – that the Supreme Court
may yet decide that the Second Amendment binds the states.34 Maybe so – it
is true that the main cases holding that states are not bound by the Second
Amendment (Cruikshank and the 1886 case Presser v. Illinois35) were decided
before the Supreme Court developed the notion of “incorporation” – but the
Court has had ample opportunity to revisit these decisions, and has declined to
do so.36 In any event, it would seem that from the revisionists point of view,
the best that can be said about these cases – and fully nine of Kopel’s [35]
cases deal with incorporation, either of the Second Amendment itself or of
another Bill of Rights provision – is that they are outdated. And yet, Kopel
actually counts them as supporting his argument, because, as he puts it, the
Court is treating the Second Amendment “in pari materia” with other Bill of
Rights provisions.37 But of course this ignores the fact that this parity has long
since evaporated.

33. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
34. KOPEL, supra note 1, at 99.
35. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
36. See Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969) and Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.),
cert. Denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
37. KOPEL, supra note 2, at 172.
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C. The Miller Opinion
There is of course one Supreme Court decision – United States v. Miller –
squarely addressing the scope of the “right to keep and bear Arms.”38 Miller
involved a prosecution under the National Firearms Act of 193439 for
unlicensed possession of a short-barreled shotgun. The District Court
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the Act violated the Second
Amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
“shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense.40

Kopel reads this passage narrowly as holding simply that the Second
Amendment permits regulation of short-barreled shotguns because they are not
military weapons – they are not, in other words, “Arms” within the meaning of
the Second Amendment. Based on this reading, Kopel insists that Miller is
perfectly consistent with the revisionists’ view of the Second Amendment; as
long as weapons are militarily useful (i.e., as long as they constitute “Arms”),
the Second Amendment provides a broad guarantee of an individual’s rights of
possession. (To be clear: Kopel does not claim that Miller compels a
revisionist approach; rather, he reads Miller as a narrow holding that begs the
fundamental issues.41)
This reading, however, suggests ambiguities in the revisionist conception
of a “personal” right. Just as with Kopel’s treatment of the militia-focused
approach, it is not clear whether his claim that the Second Amendment creates
an “individual” right to gun possession is a claim about standing or a claim
about the scope of the Second Amendment guarantee. If Kopel means simply
that individuals have standing to assert Second Amendment claims, then his
claim is if course true; as discussed above, in this sense the Second
Amendment right is obviously and trivially “individual.”
It seems clear that Kopel and other revisionists intend to go beyond this
standing claim to make a stronger claim about the types of gun possession that
are protected. Again, though, the precise nature of the claim is ambiguous.
For example, Kopel’s “personal” right may mean that an individual American
citizen is entitled to own a gun for any lawful purpose he or she chooses. But
38. Miller, supra note 3.
39. 26 U.S.C. §1132 (1934).
40. Miller, supra note 3, at 177 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §1132).
41. KOPEL, supra note 2, at 104, (the Miller decision does not foreclose either the Standard
Model or the State’s Rights theory.”)
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if this is the revisionist position, it is flatly inconsistent with Miller. If an
individual is entitled to own a gun for self-defense, hunting, recreation or any
other reason, then the military usefulness of a particular weapon should be
irrelevant to Second Amendment analysis – yet military usefulness is the
linchpin of Miller’s reasoning.
Kopel’s claim that Miller is consistent with the revisionist approach, then,
indicates that the revisionist view of the Second Amendment right may in fact
be considerably more limited than their rhetoric would suggest. The
revisionist argument might be, for example, that the purpose of the Second
Amendment was to protect the states’ ability to maintain organized militia –
but that in order for states to have this ability, they must have available a
populace armed with militarily useful weapons, and that any law denying
states access to such an armed populace violates the Second Amendment. In
this view, individual gun possession is a Second Amendment value, but for
essentially instrumental purposes – and presumably the Amendment would
protect only instances of possession that further those purposes.42
If this is what revisionists mean by an “individual” right, then Kopel is on
firmer ground in claiming that Miller is consistent with the revisionist
approach. I ultimately do not accept this claim – I still contend that Miller
should be read as defining the Second Amendment right even more narrowly
than the instrumental approach just outlined – but I concede that Kopel’s
reading of the passage quoted above (and this is certainly Miller’s key
language) is plausible.
But even accepting Kopel’s reading of Miller leaves us with virtually no
Supreme Court doctrine on the Second Amendment. Miller says very little, the
incorporation cases say very little, and all the in-passing mentions of the
Second Amendment say nothing at all. In the face of this silence, Kopel’s
effort to open a second front in the Second Amendment debate must be judged
a failure. The conventional wisdom that “the Supreme Court’s guidance [on
the Second Amendment] has been notoriously scant”43 is correct.
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Which brings us back to the first and still primary battleground staked by
the revisionists: the framers’ intent. I think the revisionists’ account of the
framing and ratification of the Second Amendment is incomplete in some very
42. The revisionists’ failure to distinguish between a robust, “self-actualization” version of
the individual rights approach and a more limited, instrumental vision had unfortunate
consequences in the Emerson case. See Emerson, supra note 7. The court in Emerson
understood the revisionist scholarship as arguing that the “amendment protects an individual right
inherent in the concept of ordered liberty” and relied on that understanding to strike down a
federal statute that undoubtedly would have survived review based on the more modest,
instrumental understanding. Id. at 600.
43. Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 12.
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important respects, but let’s assume for the sake of argument that the
revisionists are right that the framers intended every American to have the
right to own a gun, unimpeded by federal regulation.
If so, then the puzzle becomes explaining modern Second Amendment
jurisprudence. For even if Miller is read narrowly, the fact remains that lower
federal courts since Miller have – uniformly, until Emerson – adopted a strong
militia-focused approach to the Second Amendment.44 If the revisionists’
history is accurate, these cases are a shocking departure from the framers’
intentions. The important question suggested by Professor Kopel’s article – a
question never addressed by the revisionists – is: Why? If it is true that Second
Amendment jurisprudence in 1999 is different from the Founders’
understandings in 1791, how do we explain – and justify – the change?45
It is here that Professor Kopel’s article points us toward true insight. The
dearth of case law makes the Second Amendment unlike virtually any other
constitutional provision that people still care about. This makes it very
difficult to talk about how the meaning and function of the Second
Amendment have changed over time. It is obvious that First Amendment or
separation of powers or commerce clause jurisprudence has changed since
1791, and that equal protection jurisprudence has changed since 1868 – but
lawyers and judges rarely need to resort to a First Principles discussion of the
constitutional meta-jurisprudence that underlies these changes (they leave that
to law professors). Instead, they simply talk about New York Times v.
Sullivan46 and Brandenburg v. Ohio47 (instead of Schenck v. United States48
and Debs v. United States49), or NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin50 and Yakus v.
United States51 (instead of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States52),

44. See infra, notes 47-55; cf. Bradford Denning, Can the Simple Cite be Trusted?: Lower
Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961 (1995) (revisionist article claiming that lower federal courts have created doctrine going well
beyond Miller).
45. I do not wish to be misunderstood as endorsing a notion of a “living Constitution,” or the
view that changed social circumstances should prompt judges to change constitutional doctrine.
To the contrary, I believe that constitutional interpretation must respect the intentions of those
who framed and ratified the Constitution. I also believe, however, that constitutional
interpretation must treat the Constitution as an organic whole and must respect its integrity –
meaning that amendments to one part of the Constitution can have ramifications for other parts.
46. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring showing of “actual malice” to sustain libel claim by
public figure).
47. 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (holding seditious libel statute unconstitutional).
48. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction for seditious libel).
49. 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding conviction for seditious libel).
50. 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (upholding congressional delegation to administrative agency).
51. 321 U.S. 414, 430 (1944) (upholding congressional delegation to administrative agency).
52. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking down National Industrial recovery Act as excessive
delegation).
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or Brown v. Board of Education53 (instead of Plessy v. Ferguson54), or . . . you
get the point. The stark example of the Second Amendment highlights the role
case law typically plays in mediating changes in constitutional doctrine over
time – and the lack of a vocabulary other than case law for talking about such
changes.
To start developing this vocabulary, scholars will have to broaden their
inquiry beyond the narrow confines of the Amendment itself; they must stop
looking at the Amendment in isolation, and see it in the context of the entire
constitutional plan. While the text of the Second Amendment is unchanged
since 1791, other parts of the Constitution have of course been amended
dramatically. If it is true that Second Amendment doctrine has changed since
1791, one obvious place to look for an explanation is in the relationship
between the Second Amendment and the rest of the Constitution. For
example: The Second Amendment is not the only constitutional provision
dealing with the militia and other military issues. How has the meaning of the
Raise Armies Clause, and of Article I’s militia clauses, changed since 1791 –
and how do changes in the meaning of these provisions affect the Second
Amendment? Questions like these should be the central focus of Second
Amendment scholarship.

53. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding segregation in public elementary schools
unconstitutional).
54. 163 U.S. 537, 553 (1896) (approving statutory segregation of railroad cars).

